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ABSTRACT 
 
Using high frequency Euronext Paris data, the paper examines the market microstructure trading characteristics of 
venture backed initial public offerings (IPOs) in the French market. Previous North American market studies 
approve the role played by venture capital (VC) firms for the certification of IPOs and their role in reducing the 
asymmetric information between investors. The study sample is composed of IPOs realized during the period 2000–
2013 both with and without VC firm involvement. The results present no significant price difference between both 
IPO types. The cost of asymmetric information and of price volatility is higher for the VC-backed operations. 
Moreover, the study shows that underpricing is positively correlated to the cost of the information asymmetry. 
Contrary to previous studies, the results show that the effects of VC firm certification and monitoring are not 
perceived by IPO investors in the French market. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he initial public offering (IPO) process is known for its asymmetric information between investors: 
the firm insiders have easier access to private information than the individual investors. To reduce this 
asymmetry and to ensure the IPO success, a third party stakeholder should oversee the process. Wang, 
Wang and Lu (2003) confirm that venture capital (VC) certification is the best way of achieving this for two 
reasons. First, the VC firms have reliable information on the issuing firm because, being members of the board of 
directors, they benefit from special working relations with the issuing firm’s team of directors, unlike the other 
financial intermediaries. Second, the VC firms have to verify false certification to ensure that they preserve their 
reputation. 
 
Apart from their certification role, the VC firms also have a monitoring role in the firms that they finance. Because 
of their numerous investments, they are encouraged to use diverse methods to supervise or to verify opportunist 
behavior in these firms. According to Barry, Muscarella, Peavy and Vetsuypens (1990), Megginson and Weiss 
(1991), Jain and Kini (1995) and Brav and Gompers (1997), the certification and monitoring roles during an IPO can 
increase the value and improve the operational and financial performance of issuing firms in the medium to long 
term. However, numerous research studies have shown that VC firms have a negative effect on these operations. 
Amit, Brander and Zott (1998) identified an adverse selection problem where the less experienced entrepreneurs ask 
the VC firms to share the risk, whereas the more experienced ones manage their firms without requesting outside 
finance. Consequently, the firms with VC may perform badly because of information asymmetry. Gompers (1996) 
suggests a ‘grandstanding’ hypothesis on the part of young VC firms, where they are encouraged to reveal their 
abilities too soon to potential investors by assisting the firms with their portfolio in the financial markets. Therefore, 
they may find that they perform badly because of a lack of IPO experience. Generally during the IPO, either the 
adverse section effects or grandstanding aggravate the information asymmetry problem between the initiates and the 
individual investors. 
 
The existing empirical studies generally use accounts data. Our approach differs; we use microstructure measures 
from the markets including bid-ask spreads. This information asymmetry and the volatility component should be 
studied when investigating whether the participation of a VC firm contributes to reducing the information 
asymmetry during the IPO process. The markets microstructure literature shows that the spread and the volatility of 
prices increase according to the information asymmetry that exists between the insiders and the outsiders. The 
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certification/monitoring effects are stronger than the effects of adverse selection/grandstanding; however, reducing 
information asymmetry in the financial marketplace would consequently diminish the spreads and the price 
volatility for the IPOs financed by the VC firms. However, if the effects of certification and monitoring are 
dominated by the effects of adverse selection and grandstanding, then the spread and the price volatility become too 
high. Moreover, the pricing and disclosing information process during a VC-backed IPO could be clarified by 
examining the microstructure data in the financial markets because, according to O'Hara (1999) and Madhavan 
(2000), the negotiation mechanism and the structure regulating the stock markets both have an effect on investor 
behavior. 
 
I chose to investigate the French market, a market with a two-decade VC history and with few existing studies 
analyzing the role of VC firms in the French market. The empirical results show that the effective relative spreads, 
the cost of information asymmetry and the volatility of the IPOs financed by VC firms are not more reliable than 
other classic operations. Their degree of information asymmetry perceived by the market is not therefore inferior to 
that of other operations. The effect of certification/monitoring by VC firms is no more marked than that of the 
adverse selection/grandstanding. Although both effects exist, the positive effects of the certification/monitoring of a 
venture-backed IPO are largely counterbalanced by the negative effects of adverse selection/grandstanding. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: sections 2 examine the literature on the underpricing of IPOs and the VC firm 
role in certification/monitoring and in adverse selection/grandstanding. The markets microstructure literature 
relative to information asymmetry, to bid-ask price spreads, and the costs of information asymmetry and price 
volatility is also briefly presented. We introduce the selected test hypotheses. Section 3 then describes the data and 
the research methodology used in this study. Section 4 summarizes and discusses the empirical results, and finally 
section 5 presents the conclusions. 
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND PREDICTIONS 
 
2.1. Certification Theory and the Role of VC Firm 
 
Booth and Smith (1986) certification theory holds that the VC firm is best informed about the future potential and 
the correct value of the firm that it is financing, and that its role consists in certifying that the subscription price 
perfectly reflects the information in its possession. Certification is therefore a means of reducing the degree of 
information asymmetry and consequently reducing the underpricing. 
 
Within the context of a principal agent model with a moral hazard and hidden information, two types of information 
(hard and soft) can be distinguished. According to Stein (2002), hard information – such as that published in 
accounts documents and in the IPO prospectus – is quantitative and is verifiable by outsiders. In contrast, soft 
information (pertaining to the investment decision) is of a qualitative type and is not verifiable (by any person other 
than the agent who produced it). It is therefore more easily manipulated, but also more detailed and more precise 
than hard information. Megginson and Weiss (1991) confirm that the VC firm is able to certify the IPO because it 
uses the reputation that it has built up during its financing of the firm. Therefore, it can maintain a durable 
relationship with the fund managers and the institutional investors who both finance the funding and who are 
potential purchasers during the IPO. The certification generally aims to reduce the information asymmetry between 
the insiders and the firm outsiders. 
 
Gompers and Lerner (2004) indicate that VC firms are specialized in collecting and evaluating information on 
innovative firms with strong growth potential and that they are capable of overcoming the problem of information 
asymmetry that emerges during an IPO process. Tirole (2006) confirms that the presence of well-informed agents, 
such as commercial banks or VC firms, can certify the IPO and can reduce the information asymmetry. The 
certification agent must know the correct value of the firm and should inform potential investors of this. 
Consequently, an IPO financed by a VC is more successful than other IPOs because of the VC’s certification and/or 
monitoring role, and the investors in the financial market anticipate an underpriced subscription. 
 
Barry et al. (1990) agree that a VC, during an IPO, provides rigorous and regular firm monitoring, thereby making it 
possible to reduce agency costs and to underprice the subscription. Jain and Kini (1995) conclude that the presence 
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of a VC gives a positive signal regarding the firm’s quality that results in an improvement in the post IPO 
operational performance. Notably, the information asymmetry situation does not only exist between insiders and 
outsiders, it is also to be found between entrepreneurs seeking external financing and VC firms. Amit et al. (1998) 
consider that the best projects are those that are self-financed by the VC firms. Less experienced entrepreneurs have 
a tendency to involve VC firms in their investment projects. Consequently, the venture-backed firms are of a 
mediocre quality because of the information asymmetry. Apart from the adverse selection effect, Gompers (1996) 
confirms the grandstanding hypothesis for young VC firms since they are motivated by seeking an improvement in 
their reputation in the financial market to facilitate new fundraising. Consequently, there is a strong impetus for 
young VC firms to make it known in the financial market that they have the experience necessary for handling IPO 
operations correctly. Sahlman (1990) considers that a credible certification requires verifying three things: (1) 
overpriced operations damage reputations; (2) the gains procured by a false certification are negligible compared 
with the good image created over a period of time; and (3) the issuing firm must incur the cost of a reputable 
certification agent; i.e. the certification process is not cheap. VC firms are strongly motivated to preserve their 
reputation to guarantee access to sources of financing with very favorable conditions that make them more attractive 
to entrepreneurs. 
 
Wang, et al. (2003) corroborated the grandstanding hypothesis by studying the relation between the performance of 
startups and the participation of VC firms. This theory holds that the VC firms have a similar role to that of majority 
shareholders. They are implicated in the management and the recruitment of key personnel and provide assistance in 
the production process and even in developing the supplier and client relationship. The role of a VC firm during an 
IPO is outlined as follows: outsiders are uncertain of the quality of information relating to the firm, while the 
presence of a VC firm implies to the financial market that the firm is of a high quality, thereby reducing the level of 
information asymmetry. However, if an adverse selection and/or grandstanding problem exists, then the 
participation of a VC firm has no bearing on the quality of the firm. Information asymmetry is therefore weaker if 
the effects of certification/monitoring are stronger than the effects of adverse selection and/or grandstanding. 
However, during an IPO, although the effects of adverse selection and/or grandstanding are stronger than the effects 
of certification/monitoring, the degree of information asymmetry between the insiders and the outsiders for IPOs 
financed by VC firms is higher. 
 
2.2. Certification and IPO Underpricing 
 
Ritter and Welch (2002) and Loughran and Ritter (2004) confirm that IPO underpricing is observed even in the most 
efficient markets and several frameworks have attempted to explain this phenomenon. They distinguished three 
theoretical trends: (i) the impact of institutional incentives; (ii) the effect of changes in the ownership and control 
structure; and (iv) the existence of information asymmetry during IPOs. 
 
In conformity with the certification hypothesis, Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Barry, et al. (1990) showed that 
IPOs with VC firm involvement present a larger degree of underpricing than for those not involving VC firms. In 
contrast, Francis and Hasan (2001), Peggy and Wahal (2004) and more recently Arikawa and Imad’eddine (2010) 
and Elston and Yang (2010) found that IPOs without VC firm involvement show higher underpricing than those 
financed by VC firms and question the certification hypothesis, rekindling the debate on the subject. Peggy and 
Wahal (2004) tested the certification hypothesis using the samples of Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Barry, et al. 
(1990) and noted no significant difference in the level of underpricing between the two means of financing. 
Consequently, because of the transfer of assets and the commissions borne during the IPO, the cost of such an 
operation financed by VC firms is much lower than one not financed by VC firms. The question then arises as to 
why VC firms in particular bear such costs. Loughran and Ritter (2002) showed that VC firms acquire underpriced 
IPO securities to later resell them with large secondary gains. Gompers (1996) pointed out that a VC firm is 
subjected to liquidity constraints when it reimburses investors and that the IPO helps it to create a good investor 
image that in turn enables it to raise more capital for future investments. 
 
Neither explanations is convincing as the first refers to a speculative bubble in the 2000s, whereas underpricing is a 
persisting phenomenon that is independent of the period. The second explanation is not valid for all VC firms, 
particularly the youngest ones. Moreover, it is based on the American finance system, where VC firms are more 
experienced because of the large number of IPOs in that market. To reconcile these two explanations, Rossetto 
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(2008) recognized that the IPOs with VC firm involvement are distinguished by higher underpricing during the 
normal period and by overpricing during the so called ‘hot’ periods. To overcome the irregularity of empirical 
underpricing results, Rossetto (2013) proposed a theoretic model that depends on the period of issue. During a hot 
period, there are considerable opportunities for profitable investments and VC firms are motivated to recover their 
invested capital to reinvest in new projects. In normal periods, the VC firms try to maximize the yield from the 
projects in their portfolios during an IPO. 
 
Chemmanur and Krishnan (2012) reexamined the role of VC firms and conclude that underpricing is not appropriate 
for measuring the role of the VC firms and propose a third explanation as an alternative: the IPO price ratio/the 
intrinsic value. Using this variable, they show that the role of a VC firm is not only to certify the value of the IPO, 
but above all, to play a commercial role in their contacts with the other players in the financial market. The presence 
of a VC firm helps all of the shareholders to obtain the maximum from the product generated by the transfer of 
securities, and it can crucially attract serious firm purchasers who have a solid reputation. 
 
2.3. Research Hypotheses 
 
IPO information asymmetry can be measured by the bid-ask spread. The more uncertain the value, the larger the 
bid-ask spread will be. Many studies have modelled the remuneration of the market makers for information 
asymmetry risks with the aid of a bid-ask spread. The purchasing price is always lower than the sales price; this 
enables a profit to be made for each purchasing–selling operation. Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) proposed theoretic models linking the bid-ask spread and the level of information asymmetry. 
 
These models assume that the market makers expect to make losses during negotiations with an informed trader; this 
is the reason for the wide bid-ask spread. However, if the exchanges are made with a ‘noise trader’, then the market 
maker reduces the bid-ask spread. Market makers are confronted with an adverse selection problem if they do not 
know who, among the traders, has private information. The market makers therefore aim to optimize the bid-ask 
spread to maximize their profits. Consequently, the bid-ask price perfectly reflects the uncertainty and the risk of 
information asymmetry in the financial market: firms with a low level of these factors will be characterized by a 
wider bid-ask spread. Stoll (1989) estimates that the cost of information asymmetry is approximately 43% of the 
bid-ask spread in the NASDAQ and Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) claim that is approximately 35% in the NYSE. 
Moreover, Menyah and Paudyal (2000) observed that it amounts to 47% in the London Stock Exchange. 
Certification by a VC firm leads to a reduction in the costs connected with information asymmetry that has the effect 
of decreasing the bid-ask spread. Moreover, when there is a lack of transparency concerning the real value of a firm, 
we consider that there is a divergence of opinion among the investors. Shalen (1993) empirically demonstrated that 
price volatility, as an approximation of the level of information asymmetry, is strongly correlated with a divergence 
of anticipations. Because of the divergence of opinion of the noise traders, an increase in volatility is to be expected 
during the IPO, leading to an increase in the risks to which they are exposed. If certification by a VC firm enables a 
reduction in information asymmetry, then the IPO price volatility can also be reduced. If the level of information 
asymmetry is low, then it can be expected that the effect of certification/monitoring is more marked than that of 
adverse selection/grandstanding, bid-ask spread, information asymmetry cost and volatility. The following 
hypotheses have been developed to test the importance of the VC firm role during an IPO: 
 
Hypothesis 1: If the certification/monitoring effect is stronger than that of adverse selection/grandstanding, then the 
bid/ask spread of the IPOs with VC firm involvement will be weaker. 
 
Hypothesis 2: If the certification/monitoring effect is stronger than that of adverse selection/grandstanding, then the 
cost of the information asymmetry of IPOs with VC firm involvement will be weaker. 
 
Hypothesis 3: If the certification/monitoring effect is stronger than that of adverse selection/grandstanding, then the 
volatility of the IPOs with VC firm involvement will be weaker. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1. Sample and Data 
 
The study covers a 14-year period, 2000-2013, and concerns the new issues in the three Eurolist segments in the 
NYSE Euronext regulated market. Data on the capital structure, the shares held by VC firms and the price of the 
offer were obtained from the IPO prospectuses required by the financial market authorities. Moreover, the high 
frequency stock market price data, the volume of negotiations and the bid-ask prices are from Euronext databases. 
An analysis of the available data provided a sample of 93 IPOs that had VC firm involvement. Each IPO financed by 
a VC firm was paired with an operation without a VC firm (year of IPO, sector and size) to create the second control 
sample. The majority of the sample was composed of technological firms: 87% of the sample firms were in the 
biotechnical, software, medical equipment, electricity and electronic accessories, and aerospace sectors. This result 
corroborated Amit, et al. (1998) and Lee and Wahal (2004) who found that firms financed by VC firms operate in 
sectors with a high level of information asymmetry, such as biotechnology and information technology. 
 
Table 1. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Panel A: Sample with VC (n = 93)      
Offer Size (M€) 731.52 230.99 341.54 73.32 632.51 
IPO Price (€) 23.38 17.95 16.32 5.92 19.32 
MAR (%) 12.28 11.64 15.23 3.26 9.79 
Number of VC 2.36 1.74 1.78 0.83 1.78 
Shares owned by VC (%) 13.91 15.31 5.97 2.78 15.78 
Shares owned by founders (%) 49.73 52.51 16.70 6.32 15.21 
Age in years 6.81 5.36 4.32 1.98 6.26 
 
Panel B: Sample without VC (n = 93) 
Offer size (M€) 811.41 401.86 320.75 76.11 592.44 
IPO price (€) 20.38 17.02 15.65 4.68 21.32 
MAR (%) 14.52 12.26 17.31 4.28 11.08 
Shares owned by founders (%) 65.32 67.80 14.58 7.13 17.70 
Age in years 13.80 8.00 4.00 1.98 7.20 
Note: There is a total of 404 IPOs between 2001 and 2013 in the Euronext Paris stock exchange. The sample is limited to those in the Eurolist 
(A, B and C) that comprises three segments: Blue Chips includes firms with a market value greater than €1 billion; Mid cap firms with a 
market value between €150 million–€1 billion; and Small Caps firms with a market value less than €150 million. 
 
Table 1 provides a statistical breakdown of the sample. The subscription price for IPOs with VC firm involvement is 
higher than for those without VC involvement, whereas their average size is smaller. The VC capital participation 
was an average of 13.91% for an average of 2.36 VC firms per IPO. This result is lower than Barry, et al. (1990) and 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) observed in the American market (34.3%–36.6%). Given that control increases 
according to the number of shares held by the shareholder, this means that VC firms are likely to play a less 
important role in the French market. Finally, the underpricing can be defined as the yield between the closing prices 
on the first day of the negotiations and the IPO price, adjusted to the yield in the market. 
 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) hypothesized that the participation of VC firms may reduce both IPO costs and 
underpricing. Moreover, Barry et al. (1990) pointed out that the control exercised by the VC firms also helps to 
minimize underpricing. However, Lee and Wahal (2004) confirmed that underpricing is higher for IPOs with VC 
firm involvement, as the VC firms are anxious to maintain their good reputation in the market. The current results 
confirm these assertions: for operations with VC firm involvement, the underpricing amounts to 14.52%, whereas it 
amounts to 12.28% for those without VC involvement. Consequently, in the French market, VC firms try to raise 
funds rather than carrying out control or certification activities. 
 
3.2. Measures of Information Asymmetry 
 
We adopted several microstructure measurements to ascertain the degree of information asymmetry including the 
bid-ask price spread, the information asymmetry component that concerns the spread and the volatility. 
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3.2.1. Effective Spread 
 
The bid-ask price spread is the difference between the lowest purchasing price and the highest sale price. Demsetz 
(1968) takes the bid-ask spread as a recompense granted to the market-makers for them to undertake immediate 
negotiations. It is one of the main transaction costs for investors. We estimated the effective spread Si,d, and the 
relative effective spread1 RSi,d in the same way as Hebb and MacKinnon (2004): 
 𝑆",$ = 2× 𝑃",$ − 𝑀𝑃",$ 	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑅𝑆",$ = 0× 12,34512,3512,3  (1) 
 
where Pi,j designates the firm’s closing price i on day j, and MPi,d represents the middle of the bid-ask spread defined 
as (aski,d+bidi,d)/2. The terms aski,d and bidi,d respectively represent the required closing price and that of the offer for 
the firm i on day d. 
 
3.2.2. Information Asymmetry Component in the Spread 
 
This involves compensating the market-makers for negotiations with the informed traders who have the best 
information. The market-makers try to enlarge the spread during the periods where there is strong information 
asymmetry. To measure the cost of the information asymmetry in the bid-ask price spread, we followed the method 
by George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991). This is defined as 𝜙"$ = 1 − 𝜋",$ and indicates the unobservable 
proportion of the quoted bid-ask spread due to adverse selection resulting from the information asymmetry of the 
share i on day d. πi,d represents unobservable proportion of the quoted spread due to order-processing costs: 
 𝜋",$ = 0× 49:;(=>2,?,=>2,?@A)C2,3  (2) 
 
where RDi,t = RiTt – RiBt, RiTt represents 10 minutes of intraday yield for the firm i according to transaction price T in 
a lapse of time t–1 and t, RiBt represents 10 minutes of intraday yield calculated according to the bid price (Bid) B, 
Si,d is the arithmetical average over 27 periods of 10 minutes per day for the firm i and Cov(RDi,t, RDi,t–1) represents 
the covariance of the statistical series RDi,t. 
 
3.2.3. Volatility 
 
Unlike in the classical approach that uses the closing price to calculate the security yield, Garman and Klass (1980) 
propose a more relevant improved estimator that considers the high (H), low (L), opening (O) and closing (C) prices 
since the share price is supposed to follow a Brownian motion without breaks. We estimated the volatility according 
to this approach using the following formula: 
 𝜎",$0 = 0,511(𝑎 − 𝑏)0 − 0,019 𝑥 𝑎 + 𝑏 − 2𝑎𝑏 − 0,383𝑥² (3) 
 
where a = ln(H/O), b = ln(L/O), ln(C/O) and σ²i,d represents the volatility of firm i on day d. According to Garman 
and Klass (1980), the coefficients are fixed in such a way that the estimator is unbiased with minimal variance. 
 
3.3. The Basic Regression Model 
 
Consider that the presence of a VC firm enables the information asymmetry to be reduced between the issuer and the 
individual investors; hence, it is likely that there will be a decrease in the bid-ask spread, the cost of information 
asymmetry and the volatility. The particular nature of a VC firm is likely to influence the microstructure 
characteristics of the financial markets. We tested the regression in the following cross-section. 
 
 
                                                
1 Corresponds to the difference (relative to the middle of the spread) in absolute value between the price at which a transaction has been carried 
out and the middle of the spread. 
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𝑌" = 𝛼P + 𝛼Q𝑉𝐶" + 𝛼0𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑" + 𝛼W𝑁𝑏𝑟" + 𝛼Y𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒" + 𝛼\𝑀𝐴𝑅" + 𝛼^𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉" + 	  𝛼` Qabc " + 𝛼d𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠" + 𝛼i𝑁𝑇𝑟" + 𝜀" (4) 
 
where Yi represents the average of the bid-ask spreads (RSi); ϕi represents the information asymmetry and σ²i 
represents the volatility, both between days 1–30; VCi (within the capital) and Boardi (seat on the board) are two 
binary variables; Sharei represents the share held by the VC firm; Nbri indicates the number of VC firms within the 
capital; MARi represents the observed yield on the first day adjusted to that of the market; lnMVi is the logarithm of 
the firm’s equities market value; 1/Agei represents the inverse of the age of the firm in years on the day of its IPO; 
Earningsi represents the earnings per share during the year before the firm’s IPO divided by the average observed 
closing price on the first day; and NTri represents the average number of trades between days 1 and 30 following the 
IPO. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
To test the hypotheses, we first present the different microstructure characteristics of the sample. This is followed by 
the presentation of and a discussion on the empirical results. 
 
4.1. Comparison of the Subsample Microstructures 
 
I compared both subsamples in terms of their effective relative spread, their information asymmetry costs and their 
volatility using Mann–Whitney’s nonparametric test and the classic t-test. Table 2 presents the panel data for both 
subsamples on the relative differences of the effective spread. Panel A presents the average of the daily spread 
between days 1 and 5 after the start of negotiations, and Panel B presents the average for the different periods of 
time. With the exception of day 5, the results do not show any significant difference in the relative effective spread 
between the subsamples. The results for the first two time periods in Panel B (days 1–10 and days 11–21) show a 
lower relative effective spread for the IPOs with VC firm involvement, whereas the contrary is true for the third time 
period (days 21–30). These results allow me to reject the first hypothesis, where the presence of a VC firm enables a 
reduction in the level of information asymmetry. However, IPOs with VC firm involvement are characterized by a 
relative effective spread that is lower during negotiations. 
 
Table 2. Relative effective spread 
 IPOs with VC IPOs without VC Difference* 
Panel A: Daily measure    
Day 1 0.003 0.004 −0.517 (−0.70) 
Day 2 0.006 0.007 0.062 (0.15) 
Day 3 0.008 0.007 −0.386 (−1.10) 
Day 4 0.246 0.010 1.068 (1.133) 
Day 5 0.006 0.013 −2.201
α 
(−2.84) 
 
Panel B: Interval measure 
Days 1-10 0.005 0.011 −0.874 (−0.82) 
Days 11-20 0.010 0.036 0.169 (−0.45) 
Days 21–30 0.008 0.007 0.727 (0.84) 
Note: * Z-statistic of Mann–Whitney U test. This nonparametric test is used to compare two independent small samples; t-statistics are reported 
between brackets: α, β and γ respectively mean a significant coefficient at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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Table 3 presents the empirical results for the information asymmetry costs in both subsamples. Generally, the costs 
are lower for IPOs with VC firm involvement in the first few days following the IPO. All three Panel B time period 
results show that the information asymmetry costs of IPOs with VC firm involvement are not lower than those 
without. Consequently, we reject the second hypothesis. Volatility is higher for IPOs with VC firm involvement than 
those without, but this difference is less marked and not significant. 
 
Table 3. Information asymmetry analysis 
 IPOs with VC IPOs without VC Difference 
Panel A: Daily measure    
Day 1 0.236 0.300 0.208 (−0.26) 
Day 2 0.302 0.331 −0.140 (−0.01) 
Day 3 0.304 0.382 −0.178 (−0.35) 
Day 4 0.603 0.494 1.706
β 
(1.14) 
Day 5 0.539 0.610 −0.104 (0.19) 
 
Panel B: Interval measure 
Days 1 – 10 0.440 0.406 0.101 (0.79) 
Days 11 – 20 0.468 0.490 −1.006 (−0.92) 
Days 21 – 30 0.495 0.431 1.068 (1.07) 
Note: * Z-statistic of Mann–Whitney U test. This nonparametric test is used to compare two independent small samples; t-statistics are reported 
between brackets: α, β and γ respectively mean a significant coefficient at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
Table 4 shows that the volatility of IPOs with VC firm involvement is higher in each Panel B time period than in 
those without VC firm involvement. Consequently, we reject the third hypothesis. The different results (spread and 
relative information asymmetry) reject the hypothesis that the role of certification/monitoring dominates that of the 
adverse selection/grandstanding of VC firms in the French market. The results prove that the degree of information 
asymmetry in IPOs with VC firm involvement, perceived by the financial market, is not lower than those without 
VC firm involvement as far as the relative effective spread, the information asymmetry costs and the volatility are 
concerned. The results also indicate that a reduction in information asymmetry because of the effect of certification/ 
monitoring by the VC firm may be largely compensated for by the VC firm’s adverse selection/grandstanding effect. 
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Table 4. Price volatility analysis 
 IPOs with CR IPOs without CR Difference 
Panel A: Daily measure    
Day 1 0.006 0.005 1.001 (−0.02) 
Day 2 0.004 0.003 0.617 (0.79) 
Day 3 0.004 0.003 0.700 (0.58) 
Day 4 0.003 0.003 0.198 (0.05) 
Day 5 0.004 0.003 0.533 (1.01) 
    
Panel B: Interval measure    
Days 1 – 10 0.003 0.003 0.601 (0.53) 
Days 11 – 20 0.003 0.002 1.024 (1.40) 
Days 21 – 30 0.003 0.002 0.803 (0.44) 
Note: * Z-statistic of Mann–Whitney U test. This nonparametric test is used to compare two independent small samples; t-statistics are reported 
between brackets: α, β and γ respectively mean a significant coefficient at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
4.2. Analysis of Information Asymmetry and Volatility 
 
To gain a better understanding of the factors likely to influence the bid-ask spread, information asymmetry and 
volatility, we also analyzed the main IPO characteristics. Table 5 shows the results relating to the relations between 
bid-ask spreads and the factors associated with IPO characteristics. In accordance with the results presented in 
section 4.1, we observe that there is no relationship between financing on the part of the VC firm and the bid-ask 
spreads; this enables me to again reject the first hypotheses. This may be because of the particular characteristics of 
the French stock market, particularly the dominance of small investors. The bid-ask spread in this market is not 
affected by information on share prices, as most such investors are not informed. 
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Table 5. Factors Affecting the Relative Effective Spread (RSi) 
Dependent variables: Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Constant −0.139
β 
(−2.06) 
−0.174γ 
(−2.74) 
−0.179γ 
(−2.68) 
−0.180γ 
(−2.83) 
−0.226γ 
(−2.72) 
MAR 0.186 (1.20) 
0.201 
(1.00) 
0.218 
(1.09) 
0.183 
(1.19) 
0.2625 
(1.37) 
Shares    0.086
α 
(1.73) 
−0.027α 
(−1.65) 
VC 0.165 (0.93) 
   0.356 
(1.25) 
Boards  0.091 (0.583) 
  0.027 
(0.63) 
Nbr   −0.026 (−0.195) 
 −0.201 
(−1.24) 
Ln(MV) −0.207 (−0.84) 
−0.301 
(−1.224) 
−0.236 
(−1.098) 
−0.256 
(−1.26) 
−0.302 
(−1.22) 
1/Age −0.003 (−0.43) 
−0.065 
(−0.434) 
−0.014 
(−0.057) 
−0.067 
(−0.247) 
0.116 
(0.63) 
Earning 0.065 (0.50) 
0.038 
(0.236) 
0.015 
(0.083) 
0.036 
(0.326) 
0.072 
(0.32) 
NTr −0.019 (−0.11) 
0.016 
(0.054) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
−0.006 
(−0.009) 
0.025 
(0.02) 
Adjusted R² 0.153 0.173 0.185 0.199 0.208 
F-Stat. 25.99γ 24.34γ 35.19γ 28.41γ 14.23γ 
N 186 186 186 186 186 
α, β and γ respectively mean a significant coefficient at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
Table 6 shows the results of the relationship between information asymmetry costs and the characteristics of an IPO. 
Model (2) indicates that the presence of a VC firm within the board of directors has a positive impact on the 
information asymmetry cost. This result is in accordance with those in section 4.1 on IPO information asymmetry. 
Once again, IPOs that involve a VC firm do not present a lower level of information asymmetry than those with no 
VC firm involvement, thereby rejecting the second hypothesis. Table 5 also shows that, because of better 
transparency, the information asymmetry costs incurred by large firms are lower than those for small firms. 
Moreover, the information asymmetry costs are positively correlated with the degree of underpricing. This result 
enables me to maintain the hypothesis concerning the information asymmetry of IPOs whereby the issuers of 
securities are ready to accept a low subscription price in the case of limited uncertainty as to the conditions of the 
market demand (Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Michaely and Shaw (1994)). 
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Table 6. Factors affecting the Asymmetric information (ϕi) 
Dependent variables: Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Constant −0.213
β 
(−2.22) 
−0.192γ 
(−2.69) 
−0.201γ 
(−2.74) 
−0.193γ 
(−2.81) 
−0.220γ 
(−2.79) 
MAR 0.285
β 
(2.31) 
0.297β 
(2.51) 
0.294β 
(2.25) 
0.283β 
(2.19) 
0.312β 
(2.68) 
Shares    0.164 (1.21) 
0.237 
(0.15) 
VC 0.216 (1.45) 
   0.196 
(0.59) 
CA  0.450
β 
(2.38) 
  0.473 
(1.54) 
Nbr   0.037 (0.39) 
 −0.221 
(−1.49) 
Ln(MV) −0.704
α 
(−2.84) 
−0.603α 
(−3.32) 
−0.591α 
(−2.89) 
−0.630α 
(−3.01) 
−0.605α 
(−3.38) 
1/Age 0.186 (1.26) 
0.131 
(0.80) 
0.189 
(1.060) 
0.155 
(0.95) 
0.247 
(1.34) 
Earning 0.152 (1.18) 
0.211 
(1.42) 
0.102 
(0.68) 
0.157 
(0.980) 
0.199 
(1.28) 
NTr −0.066 (−0.450) 
0.028 
(0.230) 
−0.043 
(−0.24) 
−0.023 
(−0.127) 
0.083 
0.460 
Adjusted R² 0.103 0.113 0.145 0.150 0.163 
F-Stat. 18.58γ 17.52γ 21.08γ 19.04γ 19.32γ 
N 186 186 186 186 186 
α, β and γ respectively mean a significant coefficient at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
Table 5 (Panel C) shows that there is no relationship between the presence of a VC firm and the IPO volatility, 
thereby rejecting hypothesis 3. Although numerous studies on the American market show that the presence of VC 
firms reduces the IPO information asymmetry costs, my empirical results on the French market reject this 
hypothesis. Consequently, the monitoring carried out by VC firms has no effect during the IPO process in the 
French market. 
 
Table 7. Factors affecting the Price volatility (σ²i) 
Dependent variables: Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Constant −0.129
β 
(−1.87) 
−0.154γ 
(−2.61) 
−0.151γ 
(−2.74) 
−0.163γ 
(−2.76) 
−0.171γ 
(−2.79) 
MAR 0.121 (0.70) 
0.121 
(0.74) 
0.068 
(0.44) 
0.075 
(0.45) 
0.069 
(0.39) 
Shares    0.303 (1.47) 
0.261 
(0.980) 
VC 0.139 (0.806) 
   −0.326 
(−1.07) 
Boards  0.298 (1.60) 
  0.374 
(1.41) 
Nbr   0.198 (1.12) 
 0.091 
(0.401) 
Ln(MV) −0.301 (−1.39) 
−0.288γ 
(−1.73) 
−0.250 
(−1.25) 
−0.301 
(−1.38) 
−0.306γ 
(−1.65) 
1/Age 0.204 (1.50) 
0.136 
(1.10) 
0.162 
(0.81) 
0.205 
(1.103) 
0.104 
(0.307) 
Earning −0.081 (−0.51) 
−0.021 
(−0.11) 
−0.057 
(−0.39) 
−0.042 
(0.36) 
0.010 
(0.08) 
NTr 0.599
α 
(3.24) 
0.601α 
(3.54) 
0.621α 
(2.99) 
0.701α 
(3.50) 
0.815α 
(3.38) 
Adjusted R² 0.135 0.190 0.200 0.261 0.280 
F-Stat. 20.95γ 21.45γ 21.85γ 23.54γ 24.32γ 
N 186 186 186 186 186 
α, β and γ respectively mean a significant coefficient at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
The majority of studies on VC firms concentrate on the North American market; however, this study focuses on the 
French market where such activities are experiencing startup difficulties. The study examines whether the presence 
of a VC firm during an IPO enables a reduction in information asymmetry – between the insiders and the outsiders – 
using high frequency data from the French stock exchange. The results do not show a significant difference between 
the two subsamples as far as the bid-ask spreads are concerned. The information asymmetry costs for the IPOs with 
VC firm involvement are no lower than for those with VC firm involvement, whereas the price volatility for the 
IPOs with VC firm involvement is greater than for those without VC firm involvement. Consequently, the empirical 
results show that the reduction in information asymmetry caused by the VC firms’ certification/monitoring effect on 
the IPO can be largely compensated for by the adverse selection/grandstanding effect. 
 
Moreover, the study concludes that underpricing positively influences the information asymmetry cost. In fact, IPOs 
financed by VC firms are characterized by considerable underpricing that significantly increases their information 
asymmetry costs. Consequently, the presence of VC within the firm does not enable a reduction in the amount of 
asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. This result differs from previous studies on the role played 
by VC firms in the North American market. There could be several reasons for the divergence between this study 
and previous ones. First, there is a relatively low level of participation on the part of VC investors in French IPOs. 
The share of the capital held by VC firms before a French IPO is an average of 9.43%, considerably lower than the 
34.3% observed by Barry et al. (1990) in the American markets. Consequently, VC firms are unable to exercise 
active and intensive control on the firms that turn towards the financial market. Second, VC firms are relatively new 
to the French market. Grandstanding motives may incite VC firms to participate in IPOs to create a good image 
against investors and to facilitate future fund raising, rather than to help firms grow. Generally, there is no 
certification role on the part of VC firms in the French market. Finally, the majority of the exchanges in this market 
are made by individual investors; this diminishes the potential of VC firms to reduce the level of information 
asymmetry during the IPO process. 
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